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Abstract 
Through its integration in the Global Justice Movement and the establishment of 
its own Social Forum, activists of the Kurdish Movement in Turkey seek to 
contest, re-appropriate and change the ‘conceived spaces’ of Turkey’s Kurdish 
Southeast. This case-study of the Mesopotamia Social Forum provides a window 
onto how activists assess the existing inequalities and initiate alternative politics, 
and how these are informed by and related to changing political discourses on 
the role of civil society and democratization, the latter being rethought and 
narrated in the ideological discourse of the movement. The region of 
Mesopotamia is thereby reclaimed and reproduced as a political space that is to 
serve as a postnationalist imaginary and consequently go beyond ‘Kurdistan’. 
 
 
Introduction: The production of a political space  
 
Contemporary geographers have convincingly argued for a relational approach to space and 
place. Indeed, any nation, region or city is also a product of relations which spread out way 
beyond it.1 The local and global are actually mutually constituted, which goes against the 
tendency to imagine the local as a product of the global, ruling out agency.2 In fact, the local 
all too often figures as a victim of globalization, consequently diminishing our understanding 
of the potential of local agency. The local is not simply always a victim or, conversely, a 
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redoubt against the global. Instead, the local can be conceived of as the moment through 
which the global is constituted, invented and produced.3 Space does not just ‘exist’, waiting to 
be discovered, but is created through a whole series of forms and scales by social individuals.4 
Consequently the local can seek to alter the mechanisms of the global. This may imply 
strategies and tactics that consciously seek to contest perceived threats of globalization 
(cultural homogenization, international capitalism, etc). The Kurdish movement’s ideological 
appropriation and re-imagination of Mesopotamia may be regarded as such an attempt. It 
seeks to produce an alternative political imaginary and consequent political project in answer 
to the socio-political realities it holds responsible for existing inequalities. This paper seeks to 
inquire this appropriation and re-imagination of Mesopotamia (rather than Kurdistan – see 
below). Taking the Mesopotamia Social Forum as a starting point, an investigation is made of 
the regionally initiated ideological change aspired to by the activists of the Kurdish movement 
and (steered) by the movement’s political leadership. This paper bears testimony to the 
ongoing project of the Kurdish Movement to re-think the spatial order of current politics, 
moving from the idea of Kurdistan as a classical nation-state toward a project for autonomy, 
within its philosophy of a democratic society, and, at the same time, opening up a political 
space of its own by means of performative political acts, such as the 2009 Mesopotamia 
Social Forum.    
   
 
“Cîhanke Din Jî Pêkan E”: Another World is Possible! 
 
“Wir denken, dass allein die Gründung eines derartigen Forums in unserer Region 
allen voran KurdInnen, aber auch anderen Menschen und Völkern, einen Rahmen 
dafür bieten wird, unsere Stimme erheben zu können undgegenseitiges Vertrauen und 
Solidarität aufzubauen.” 
 
“We believe that founding this kind of forum in our region can serve as a framework 
for Kurds primarily, but also other people and peoples, to increase our voice and to 
build mutual confidence and solidarity.”   
(Sultan Toptaş, MSF organizing committee member,  
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from his interview in Kurdistan Report, Nr.142, May/June 2009)5 
 
Together with my Kurdish friend Zozan, I explored the Mesopotamia Social Forum site in 
Diyarbakır’s Sümer Park. A huge tent had been put up in the park, in front of which were 
hung banners calling for international solidarity and socialism. On the flanks of the tent 
pictures of the Mexican Zapatista-movement were displayed, bearing testimony to the global 
diffusion and appropriation of ‘traveling’ anti-capitalist symbols and action repertoires. In the 
top of the trees surrounding the tent I noticed a flag that displayed a picture of PKK leader 
Abdullah Öcalan, taken at the time he was still living under Syrian protection in Damascus. In 
a smaller tent next to the tent brochures, leaflets and magazines of the Kurdish movement 
were displayed and the famous kafiyyes on sale, in the obligatory Kurdish yellow, red or 
green. Finding the emblems of the Kurdish movement so openly displayed surprised me. It 
stood in sharp contrast to the environment of insecurity that had prevailed in Diyarbakır in the 
1980s and 1990s. Back then, the state of emergency was still in place, allowing for fierce 
repression by the Turkish security forces and their intelligence service. The PKK insurgents 
were in active combat with the Turkish military and the people living in the Kurdish 
provinces subject to continuous surveillance. In particular, public life had suffered from 
curfews and restrictions, creating both physical and psychological barriers for collective 
action.6  
 
The war had not ended, but a more peaceful atmosphere had emerged following the capture of 
Öcalan in 1999 and the subsequent unilateral cease-fires by the PKK, combined with a change 
in the political atmophere due to the election into central government of a new party (the 
AKP) and into local office of the Kurdish political party, DEHAP. The latter event in 
particular allowed Kurdish political activists to more actively pursue political change by other 
means than armed struggle. Indeed, as Gambetti has convincingly argued, with DEHAP’s 
election to the metropolitan municipality of Diyarbakir, “[…] the municipality become an 
engine force that opened new spaces of communication and expression, which not only 
fostered cultural life, but also allowed for new political publics to emerge.”7  
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Of importance to the opening up of a local space for political and civic activism in the 
southeast of Turkey was the fact that the state’s presence was already confined to a military 
presence and its political legitimacy undermined by repressive measurements in face of the 
PKK insurgency and the popular support it enjoyed. Consequently municipalities run by the 
Kurdish party – reformed as the DTP following the banning of DEHAP – thus came to be 
perceived by their local constituency as both benevolent actors willing to ensure their socio-
economic well-being and political representatives asserting the rights of Kurdish people and 
fighting for political security against the local elements of the state.8 In so doing, they found 
ways to draw in EU-financing for local development and civil society projects. This allowed 
them to circumvent the dependency on Ankara, Turkey’s capital, and implied further 
incorporation of and adaptation to the ‘civil society talk’ that had become increasingly 
popular internationally since the end of the Cold War era in the 1990s and throughout the 
2000s. This was the time and context in which political activists of the Kurdish movement, 
and in particular the Mayor of Diyarbakir, started to become involved in the Global Justice 
Movement, taking the World Social Forum of Porto Alegre (2001) as an inspiration.  
 
Participation into the Global Justice Movement  
 
The Social Forums constitute part of the global justice movement, known also as the anti-
globalization movement, that is thought by some to have developed with the revolt of the 
Zapatistas (EZLN) in Chiapas in 1994, and by others with the 1999 Seattle meeting in 
opposition to the World Trade Organization. The Global Justice Movement is currently 
defined as a “loose network of organizations (with varying degrees of formality and even 
including political parties) and other actors engaged in collective action of various kinds, on 
the basis of the shared goal of advancing the cause of justice (economic, social, political, and 
environmental) among and between peoples across the globe” (Della Porta 2007: 6). It 
developed from a critique of the Old Left for neglecting issues of human rights in its struggle 
for state power and following the leftist movement’s failures having achieved state power. 
Today, the Social Forums gather together a wide range of groups and organizations opposed 
to neoliberal globalization and imperialism in all its forms.9  
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Particularly attractive for the Kurdish movement – as for other representatives of 
marginalized groups worldwide – has been the Global Justice Movement’s promotion of 
diversity in contrast to all kinds of hegemonic thinking or pensée unique.10 The stress on the 
importance of diversity relates to the criticisms that befell nationalist and labor movements of 
the 19th and 20th centuries, which, albeit for different reasons, both regarded internal 
uniformity (thus conformity) as essential for the development and growth of their political 
projects, ultimately leading to different forms of dictatorship and the repression of socio-
cultural diversities, including those centered on ethnicity. This is a critique upon which 
Abdullah Öcalan has also elaborated in order to reposition his political movement in the 
political spectrum, what is more, the debate over the ethnic dimension of the so-called 
“southeastern question” had been breaking point within the Left in Turkey throughout the 
second half of the 20th Century, as testify other contributions to this special issue. For the 
GJM, the importance of diversity is not only a recognition of social and cultural diversity in 
and of itself but also deemed an essential feature (ideological value, structural principle) of 
the GJM itself, which thus does not seek to unify and establish central power but aims to 
preserve internal diversity through relying on multiple intersecting networks.11 Inspired by the 
GJM, mayors and activists for pro-Kurdish causes would actively take part in the European 
Social Forum in Athens (2005), and ultimately set up their own Forum in the fall of 2009. 
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Social Forum set-up in Sümer Park, Diyarbakır (picture by the author) 
 
Re-appropriating and reconfiguring political space  
 
The Mesopotamia Social Forum was intended to serve as a platform for the re-appropriation 
and reconfiguration of political space. It was constitutive also of the public space that is being 
created regionally in Turkey’s Southeast12, wherein the organization of the MSF served as a 
performative act, displaying the means of the Kurdish movement to contest the existing 
authority structures (Gambetti 2004: 45).13  The organizers presented the Social Forum as:  
“[A] range of social initiatives, unions, civil society organizations, local governments, 
and individuals based in Mesopotamia, the cradle of humanity and for centuries a 
source of inspiration for the world’s socio-cultural development, our aim is to come 
together with a growing number of groups worldwide who declare ‘another world is 
possible.’”14  
 
The MSF was envisioned by its organizers as the starting point of a broad social movement 
for the whole of the Middle East, in which the Kurdish movement – similar to the Zapatista’s 
active in the autonomous Mexican province of Chiapas15 – aspires to play a vanguard role.  
The MSF was organized with the support of the Council of the World Social Forum, 
following upon the 2005 Turkish Social Forum and preceding the European Social Forum 
(ESF) held in Istanbul the following summer (July 2010). One of the ESF preparatory 
meetings was consequently held in Diyarbakır in the run-up to the MSF.  
The MSF sought to attract international attention and draw in participation from activists in 
and outside of the Middle East, even though the focus of the majority of its panels was the 
regional developments inside southeastern Turkey. Among the signatories to the MSF were 
many broadly leftist Southeast-based associations (representing human rights, women’s 
rights, writers, poverty, the media and culture centers), as well as a range of nationally based 
workers’ unions and cooperatives, along with the DTP and the Labor Party, Revolutionary 
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Socialist Workers Party, Workers Movement Party, Socialist Democracy Party, Green Party 
of Turkey and others close to the DTP-led municipalities in the Kurdish inhabited region.16 
The aim of the MSF was defined as “being a source of solidarity to stand against mankind’s 
tyranny over fellow man and nature, which has led to all forms of decay and destruction.”17 
Whereas the majority of the participants on the panels as well as the audience consisted of 
local Kurdish (and Turkish) activists, a number of foreign activists and associations were 
present, such as the Palestinian People Solidarity Association (FHDD) and the Palestinian 
Popular Front for Liberation (FHKC), the Association of Women’s Committees in Palestine, 
the Israeli Women’s Coalition for Peace, the Italian Un Punto Per and COBAS-Italy, as well 
as trade unions from Lebanon.  
 
In the run-up to the MSF, calls had been made by the host organizer, the DTP-run Greater 
Municipality of Diyarbakır, for all interested to submit panel proposals. Dozens of meetings 
were held to mobilize for the Forum, in Kurdish cities (such as Batman and Van, and also 
Erbil in Kurdish [North] Iraq18), as well as with Armenian, Palestinian and Syrian 
sympathizers in the neighboring countries.19 Kurdish activists in Europe, utilizing their 
existing networks of cooperation with the local civil societies in Germany, Italy, France, 
Spain and Belgium, called for European activists to participate in the MSF and the Amed 
International Youth Camp, which was organized simultaneously. Whereas the MSF 
functioned as a platform to unite different organizations and parties, the Amed International 
Youth Camp functioned as a means to socialize European activists into the main ideas and 
goals of the Kurdish movement.  
 
The Mesopotamia Social Forum in Diyarbakır takes its name from Öcalan’s and the Kurdish 
movement’s use of ‘Mesopotamia’. It refers to the lands populated by Kurds and other ethnic 
and linguistic groups, in a way that pre-dates the current arrangement of nation-states (and 
                                                           
16
 MSF Program, p. 15 
17
 Ibid. p. 2, 2009 
18
 Or, from the Kurdist perspective, in Southern (Iraqi) Kurdistan. For ease of reference, standing state 
boundaries are assumed here for naming purposes, and the standard name ‘the Southeast’ likewise used, which 
also asumes a standing state reference (to Turkey). 
19
 These International connections are interesting in the light of the Kurdish movement’s armed-to-civic 
transformation, insofar as they figure deep in PKK history. It was in Syria that the PKK leadership was based for 
many years (Öcalan fled there from Turkey in 1979, while the party was still being established – he himself was 
from Urfa, a Turkish province bordering Syria), while the PKK received its first military training in an ex-
Palestinian base in Lebanon, supported by Palestinian organizations, including Yasir Arafat’s ‘Fatah’ movement 
(the first experience in armed combat for the PKK was fighting alongside Palestinians against the attacking 
Israeli forces, in 1982). 
8 
 
thus a geographical area bound of the existing state borders). Its employment operates in 
Turkey and transnationally (particularly among the Kurds in Europe) to signify a Kurdish 
identity, the Kurdist cause. It is used, for example, as the name for cultural centers, such as 
the MKM, Mezopotamya Kültür Merkezi, satellite TV channels (Mezopotamya TV, MMC, 
Mezopotamya Music Channel,), news agencies (MHA, Mezopotamya Haber Ajansı), 
Facebook pages (Mesopotamia), radio stations (Dengê Mezopotamya) etc.20 
 
By means of the MSF, the region of Mesopotamia is re-imagined as a political space to be 
(re)appropriated and transformed. Tellingly, the MSF official program cover displayed an 
image of the Mesopotamia region that incorporated most of the Middle East – that is, 
including most of modern day Iran and Saudi Arabia, along with the Eastern Mediterranean 
and Nile area of the ‘Fertile Crescent’ version of Mesopotamia, and omitting the western part 
of Turkey. Mesopotamia motifs used in the Kurdish movement,  it might be noted, more often 
show only the rivers area, similar to the maps of Kurdistan (i.e. not the eastern 
Mediterranean). This cartographical overlap of Kurdistan with Mesopotamia with the Middle 
East mirrors the discourse of Öcalan and Turkey’s Kurdish movemnent as represented at the 
MSF – not least because it effectively puts the Kurdish populated area pretty much at the 
center.  That no borders of any kind were shown on this map was no coincidence either, as it 
communicated a new imaginary for the political transformation of the Middle East.  
 
Indeed, one of its main organizers of the Forum confirmed that the MSF intended to reclaim 
Mesopotamia as a place for the creation of a new civilization and that the main means to this 
end is would be the initiation of a new social movement in the Middle East through the Social 
Forum.21 With the organization of the Forum in the (Turkish) Kurdish heartland, activists 
from different parts of the world were drawn into the political space the Kurdish movement 
seeks to re-appropriate and develop. Ultimately the Forum sought to mobilize support for its 
political project by tapping into transnational activist networks that stretch in and beyond 
Mesopotamia.  
 
In the following sections I will explain how the MSF provided a window onto (1) the ways in 
which Kurdish political activists assess the existing inequalities inside Turkey, to explain (2) 
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the lack of democratization in the Middle East and portray the potential role of the Kurdish 
movement, in contesting these conceived spaces and (3) how these are framed within a more 
extended narrative by the ideological leader Turkey’s Kurdish movement.  
 
(1) The MSF as a means to assess and explain existing inequalities 
 
The call for the MSF depicted the region of the Near East and Mesopotamia as suffering from 
centralistic and theocratic structures that had denied the existences of the different peoples 
and turned the region into ‘a graveyard of peoples’. Referring to the political structures of the 
modern nation-state the call went on to assert that “Capitalist modernity and political models 
based on the nation-state, supported by the West as a solution to theocratic structures, have 
been unsuccessful in bringing stability, just as they have been unable to democratize the 
Middle East.”22 
 
The grand vision implied in this call was rather parochially interpreted at the Forum itself, 
however. The panels held at the Mesopotamia Social Forum concentrated on exposing the 
effects of spatial strategies that have been employed in Southeastern Anatolia by Turkish 
authorities since the establishment of the Republic. Panels entitled “Mesopotamia in the 
middle of water and energy wars”; “A story of non-development in the axes of capitalist 
politics: ‘GAP’”; “Use of water against human and nature. The Struggle Experiences”, all 
engaged with a criticism of the existing hydraulic dam projects in Southeastern Anatolia, 
which are conceived as examples of the contemporary colonialization and exploitation of the 
Kurdish region of Turkey by the state.23 Other policies held responsible for the 
‘backwardness’ of the region and its people were equally focused on the  Kurdish region of 
Turkey as opposed to the wider Mesopotamian context, such as “the Bourgeois education 
system”, indicative of the Marxist origins of the PKK (see belw), and “urban transformations 
and urban poverty”, related to the overpopulation of the urban centers in the Southeast caused 
by the forced displacement of Kurdish people from their villages and hamlets as part of 
Turkey’s counterinsurgency warfare against the PKK.  
 
As an imaginary, the Kurdish ethos was depicted by many speakers as natural, harmonic, self-
sustaining and maintaining a balance between human and animal life. What was essentially 
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constructed throughout the narrations of the speakers was a rural life which had been 
uprooted, forcing the Kurdish populations to find refuge into the cities where they had 
encountered capitalist relations, consumption and poverty. In the words of anarchist Gazi 
Bertal, who joined the provocatively titled panel ‘We don’t request anything from the state’:  
“People of the villages have come to the cities and been turned into the slaves of their 
labor. They wanted to live in the villages, and sustain themselves, but they have found 
themselves now living in a world of metal and concrete. How are they to escape from 
this?” 
The disruption of what is narrated as the traditional Kurdish life is understood in this 
discourse as a conscious, state-led destruction. Poverty is conceived as a politically planned 
strategy: “now they are trying to stop the Kurds by means of poverty”, as one of the 
participants in the panel put it. Poverty is perceived and explained as the current matrix of a 
decades old politics of assimilation by the central Turkish government and its administration, 
as an instrument of political engineering that makes Kurds subordinate and deprives them of 
their sense of honor and self-worth. Particularly strong, therefore, is the shared imaginary of 
the Kurds as a self-reliant people in their natural surroundings in contrast to the present 
miserable existence of the masses in urban slums. 
 
A panel on poverty and development organized by NGO representatives working with the 
poor on a daily basis was illustrative in this respect. Its participants underwrote the following 
thesis:  
“Those families that migrate in order to produce seasonal labor live in inhumane 
conditions. They do not have social security and they cannot provide for the needs of 
their children. In these cities in the West they are social outcasts. They are being 
described as ‘the children who feed from the dustbins’, as children empty garbage bins 
in order to earn a living. Poverty has become permanent in many regions.”24  
 
Şerif Camcı, director of Sarmaşık, an umbrella-organization of different municipality-related 
associations that fight poverty, expressed it more bluntly:  
 
“This is a dark plan. First they impoverish the people so that then they can lend them a 
helping hand (…) They molest our people through impoverishment. (…) In the past 
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people were ashamed to ask for help, but now they are coming and asking for food. 
And thus there is a second goal: people are losing their identity. The poverty degrades 
them.” 
 
Similarly the panel entitled ‘Use of Water, Against Humanity and Nature. The Struggle 
Experiences’ defined the huge dam projects on the Tigris, Euphrates and Zap rivers as a 
means to separate people from one another and to destroy human relations: “People wanted 
the power over this land, but they were not allowed to enjoy that right.” The plans for new 
hydraulic dams are presented as a form of occupation by the (Turkish) state intended to 
destroy the social and historical as well as the cultural heritage of the (Kurdish) people:  
 
“The goal of these dams is not to produce electricity but to wash away all this heritage. 
They try to take away the land from the people. People will be left behind deracinated. 
In this way the GAP is able to destroy the whole region.”25  
 
Gambetti argues that few researchers have addressed the place-based framing of 
movements.26 This is in particular relevant with regards to the civil society that developed in 
Diyarbakir, fully displayed in the MSF. Through the MSF panels and activities, “the lived 
spaces” or “the spaces of representation” (Lefevbre 1991) – that is, the spaces of expression, 
conveyed by images and symbols wherein given societal conditions can be called into 
question (Löw 2008) – were set against the “conceived spaces” of the planners, urbanists and 
technicians who are pre-structuring the “perceived space” – that is the space-related modes of 
behavior, bodily experience and the suffering of places (Löw 2008) – through state-led, top-
down, imposed policies of displacement and destruction.     
 
(2) The MSF as a means to re-approriate and transform the conceived spaces 
 
According to Lefevbre, emancipatory politics presuppose a particular set of theoretically 
informed spatial practices aimed at overcoming separation and dissociation of the global 
‘whole’ and the ‘local’ everyday: “The landscape is impregnated with symbols and imagery 
that have an explicit and insidious impact in spatial practices of everyday life […] therefore 
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the symbolic landscape remains a formidable means of appropriating space” (Merrifield 
1993: 526, referring to Lefevbre’s Production of Space).  Opposing the ‘conceived spaces’, 
activists of the Kurdish movement seek to produce an alternative political imaginary and 
consequent political project. Many panels at the Forum consequently sought to engage with 
alternative means to challenge the problems of the (primarily Southeast) region, as these were 
perceived. Illustrative here were the panels entitled “Anti-racist struggles” (classical Kurdist 
discourse), “Civil Disobedience Experiences, Militarism and Civil Space” (referencing the 
change in emphasis from armed to political resistance), “Ecological alternatives” (the Kudish 
imaginary, as described), “Cultural transformations in the Middle East and it’s initiators 
assembly” (the wider Mesopotamian project); and “Alternative municipality and local 
government experiences” (the ongoing political project in the Southeast).  
 
The MSF panels sought to increase the capacity of the locally initiated initiatives that seek to 
strengthen counter-politics, and contributed to the ongoing struggles to ‘decolonize’ not only 
Diyarbakır and the South East (Gambetti 2008), but also Kurdistan and the Middle East at 
large. What is more, they were also meant to reaffirm the Kurdish movement’s own role in 
the political transformation of the claimed political spaces. Exemplary here were speakers’ 
statements such as: “We have installed in our people consciousness about the importance of 
nature and historical heritage!”; “We negotiate with the people in our municipalities, this has 
never been the case before!”; “The experiences we have had here in Diyarbakır are important 
examples to implement amongst the Kurdish immigrants in Istanbul”; “The kind of political 
organization we have got here should be transported to the west of Turkey”; “The alternative 
press should be united”; “The Kurdish press will be the alternative press of Turkey.” 
 
Similar ‘success stories’, such as Mexico’s Zapatistas were referred to, suggesting parallels 
between the indigenous struggle against the Mexican government and American imperialism 
on the other side of the Atlantic, and the Kurdish movement’s own struggle for autonomy. As 
a symbol for the anti-globalization movement, the Zapatistas figured as a reference point 
throughout the Camp and the MSF. Not only was the Zapatista slogan ‘Ya Basta!’ (Enough!) 
appropriated (as the Kurdish ‘Edi Beşe’), but also its activities displayed in a photo exhibition, 
as well as on stage and in the panels.  A German representative of the organization Ya Basta! 
Network of solidarity with the Zapatistas gave an account of the functioning of the 
autonomous districts under Zapatista control and their independence of the central Mexican 
13 
 
state. The Zapatista movement is assumed to have inspired PKK leader Öcalan in developing 
his own political concepts that sought to re-invent and re-energize his organization.27 
 
(3) The MSF as the translation of a new ideological project  
 
Knowledge of how the whole is constituted and its relation to place and space is that which 
must be acted upon politically.28 Behind the MSF lies the Kurdish movement’s ongoing 
exercise in the production of ‘knowledge’ to explain and frame the (locally-lived) experiences 
of suppression and domination. The MSF philosophy has it that the state apparatus – regarded 
as in decay – is to be abandoned, and the personal liberation of individuals who constitute the 
people is to accelerate this process. “States do not solve problems but create them,” one of the 
organizers explained me. He continued: 
 
“The organizations that are connected to the Kurdish movement are civil organizations 
because in principle we seek to develop ties with the social parts of society and not 
with the governmental ones. We want to reach out to the grassroots. We think that 
social movements are more effective in addressing the problems, whereas states are 
profit organizations.”29  
 
The organizers’ philosophy draws on Öcalan’s prison writings, by means of which he has 
sought to transform the main ideological ideas of the Kurdish movement since his 
imprisonment in 1999.  
 
The Middle East has been imagined in the writings of Öcalan as unchanged and stagnated, 
due to the continuation of feudalism, the state system and the showy imitations of the West by 
its leaders. The aforementioned Middle East as a ‘graveyard’ perspective (employed in the 
call for the MSF) is to be found in Öcalan’s discourse, as quoted, indeed, in the MSF 
program: “The Middle East is a grave, and an inextricable knot of a grave, which remains the 
same while the rest of the world is constantly changing.”30 The way Öcalan depicted the 
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Middle East reaffirmed the Western idea of Middle Eastern exceptionalism, as a region 
incapable of democratization and in need of secularization. Öcalan called for the need to 
‘regenerate intellectual life’, to bring about a ‘mental revolution’. “The true tragedy arises 
from the inability of the Middle East itself to analyze its own traditions in order to transform 
them into something more contemporary”, and “The region has not yet understood itself.”31 
These insights are, of course, particularly pertinent in the light of the recent ‘Arab spring’.  
 
For those familiar with the role of auto-critique or self-criticism as an instrument in the 
process of PKK militants’ socialization,32 it will indeed appear that Öcalan had assumed the 
personal exercises in (public) self-criticism could be transposed onto collective bodies as a 
whole. Öcalan argued that the Middle East needs to develop its own answer in relation to 
European civilization: that it should neither reject it nor allow itself to be enveloped by it is 
the message. Instead he called for a ‘counter-offensive’ in which ‘the buried humanistic and 
civilizational values of the Middle East’ need to be ‘awakened’. It is in this context that by 
seeking to revive and reclaim Mesopotamia as the cradle of civilization he claims to find 
authentic and indigenous inspiration: “… Mesopotamia can be credited with having played a 
vanguard role over at least 10,000 formative years;”33 “The ideas and memories at the basis 
of civilisation have been forgotten but they are still there.”34  
 
It can hardly be a coincidence that Öcalan’s re-invention of the Kurdish imaginary of 
Mesopotamia through his writings took place in the early 2000s, during the acceleration of 
Iraqi’ Kurdistan’s process of political autonomization as well as the simultaneous neoliberal 
exploitation of Southern Kurdistan by contemporary capitalist forces (by Turkish enterprises 
in particular). Öcalan’s imaginary developed in dialogue with these ongoing political 
economical developments amongst the Kurdish brethren in Iraq and provides a way of 
differentiating and repositioning the goals of the Kurdistan Workers Party vis-à-vis the 
politics of its competitors in today’s ‘free Kurdistan’.   
 
In the Prison Writings Abdullah Öcalan thus tries to argue against the existence of the state. 
The state, he argues, results from class society, which results from the division of people into 
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those who rule and those who are ruled.35 According to Öcalan the ‘state’ has always been 
passed down as something sacred, but it is a dangerous concept that is meant to preserve 
exploitation and oppression.36 In order to explain his point, he outlines a historiography of 
‘the Sumerian civilization’ which is to serve as an archetype for the current political order(s). 
Whereas he praises the achievements and impact of the Sumerian ‘first state-society’ that 
came into existence along the rivers of Tigris and Euphrates in Lower Mesopotamia, however, 
he criticizes its ‘hegemonic ideology’, as having prepared humankind for the system of 
slavery and systematic violence, and which was conceived by the Sumerians (and subsequent 
‘civilizations’) as a necessary means in the face of the resistance and struggles for freedom of 
oppressed peoples, classes and individuals.37  
 
According to Öcalan, the existing political institutions need to be replaced in order for a new 
‘democratic civilization’ to develop. The state is regarded as resistant to democratic change, 
in particular as its political institutions are perceived as existing ‘outside of society’.38 The 
cure is to come from the third sphere, that is ‘civil society’. In Öcalan’s words: “It is exactly 
this sphere – which compromises the tools of democratic politics – that opens the door to the 
developments hitherto impossible.”39 And thus the need for ‘civil society projects’ that would 
contribute to the democratization of state institutions and society. Öcalan believes that in the 
Middle Eastern states societies do not have the strength to democratize themselves: only the 
development of civil society as this third domain offers the opportunity to end the status 
quo.40  
 
The insistence on the politically transformative role of civil society should be understood in 
the light of the above mentioned experiences in the establishment of local civil society 
initiatives by the Kurdish movement in Turkey, within neighborhoods and cities, in particular 
in these localities where the Kurdish party was able to organize, win support from and 
increase its leverage on the Kurdish poor and internally displaced. This was in particular so as 
by the end of the 1990s it was the cities rather than then the mountains that had become the 
main action terrain for mobilization of political support for Kurdish causes, and the main 
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objective of the PKK itself had shifted from a struggle for an independent Kurdish state to a 
project for the societal and consequently political organization of the region.  
 
Jongerden and Akkaya have persuasively argued that the primary objective of the PKK is still 
an independent Kurdistan, but that the road to this end is no longer sought by means of state-
building, but society-building: today the PKK organizational structure does not aim at the 
establishment of classical state but the construction of what is called ‘Kurdistan Democratic 
Society’, initiated from below.41 This is sought by means of the project for ‘democratic 
confederalism’ – now recast as ‘democratic autonomy’ – build on the ideal of a self-
government of local communities and organized in the form of open councils, town councils, 
local parliaments and congresses (following and probably inspired by the Zapista model).42 
The Turkish state, but ‘states’ more generally, are held responsible for all forms of 
subordination. It follows logically that in the withering of the state envisaged, ‘Kurdistan’ 
cannot stand for a country, and must name a region – one that, however, as ethnically defined 
is vulnerable to the nationalist (‘racist’) oppression that has characterized statehood during the 
capitalist period, to wit, that of the Republic of Turkey. Hence the preference for 
‘Mesopotamia’.43 
 
Essentially, what is sought is ‘governance by the people’ instead of ‘government of 
populations’. The ideal is some form of communalism. Therefore, politics should be initiated 
from the local level. This means, in practice, that the local level becomes the central focus 
where, municipalities in cooperation with other organizational bodies, such as the Democratic 
Society Congress (DTK), local NGOs and business associations are to serve as the means of 
governance by the people. In the words of a founding member of the Peace and Democracy 
Party (BDP), the current Kurdish political party (following the High Court closure of the 
DTP): 
 
“Processes and ideologies of the past should be overcome. In the past we had a 
hierarchical understanding of the state, but people are longing for democracy, equality 
and a world of ecological and gender balance. Because of its heterogeneous structure, 
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the grassroots can produce a way out of the current situation (…) We have to leave the 
state apparatus behind and go beyond the state. We should accelerate the decline of the 
state that is already ongoing. (…) The local municipalities are not the departments of 
the state but places where the local population has something to say! States are the 
cause of violence and this has become controversial. Instead we opt for local 
governance and this is not in order to feed or help the state. Local municipalities are 
more than local service providers and they do not reflect the central state. They are 
based on governance that involves everyone.”44  
 
Öcalan’s primary philosophical approach in developing the idea of Marxist and Zapatista 
styled democratic confederalism, currently retranslated into the call for (regional) autonomy,  
has been through an engagement with political thinkers who have inspired the anti-
globalization or global justice movement, such as Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt’s ‘anti-
globalization bibles’ Empire and Multitude. Thus, he plays the post-nationalist card, depicting 
nationalism and capitalist modernity as responsible for the backwardness of the Middle East 
and the ongoing dictatorial regimes. It is in this post-nationalist, anti-globalist/capitalist 
framework that Öcalan re-imagines the struggle of his own movement, in terms of the 
awakening of Kurds, as a civilizing and liberating source in the world. As he states in the 
concluding paragraphs of his Prison Writings:  
 
“By democratizing themselves, the Kurdish people force the countries and nations 
among which they live to do the same. In former times the Kurdish movement had 
always seemed to be at the mercy of external powers. Now it has become a guarantee 
for peace, liberty and fraternity.”45  
 
Öcalan sees it as a historic mission for the Kurds to become the democrats for a (future) 
democratic Iran, Iraq, Turkey and Syria, and ultimately even an unbounded Middle East: “The 
Kurds could be a tool for achieving a democratic Middle East”.46 He calls for the freedom of 
‘religions’, ‘ethnic groups’ and ‘minorities’ to organize themselves. No longer is it a state that 
is to be fought for, but the self-organization of Kurds as Kurds – having liberated themselves 
through a disengagement from the hegemony of the state and societal hierarchies. 
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Conceptually, this ideological transformation is represented by the shift in emphasis away 
from ‘Kurdistan’ towards ‘Mesopotamia’, which is not so much referenced as a pre-state ideal 
as reclaimed for a future construct. In order to democratize Mesopotamia (the Middle East) 
and change the political and geographical configuration of the region, it is argued, Kurds must 
first reshape themselves and develop a democratic mentality free of hierarchical power 
relations and patriarchy. This psycho-cultural transformation should allow the initiation of a 
new kind of grassroots politics and society that will find its translation into how people relate 
to and organize the geography of the region.  
 
The universalism proclaimed is in line with the future Öcalan would like to envision for the 
Kurdish people, as he believes that the Kurds can, through democratizing themselves, help to 
democratize the Middle East, and that the Kurdish movement can therefore become a 
guarantor for peace and liberty. Öcalan has thus also sought to position himself and his 
movement in relation to the left and former socialist projects. In this way his writings and the 
subsequent developments in the Kurdish movement in Turkey – including the organization of 
a Social Forum – are to appeal to the national and international left and serve as a means to 
assert the PKK’s relevance in the vanguard of international revolutionary movements. Thus 
he argues that “A socialist way of life and government can only be developed through a 
profound democratic awareness of society”, and “It is not the state that needs to be 
strengthened, but society. This is what I call democratic society, and its result will be 
democratic civilization.”47 Progressive forces, in Öcalan’s view, and especially new social 
movements, are in need of a historical perspective in order to go beyond the superficial 
towards questions of emancipation – in particular because, as he continues, Marxist theory, 
ideology and practical politics have been prone to influences from the ideologies and practices 
of the ruling classes, placing the left in need of ‘constructive self-criticism’.48 Obviously, 
Öcalan would like to see the historiography he himself has developed in his writings to be 
taken as a starting point for future acts of self-criticism and improvement.  
 
Discussion and concluding remarks  
 
On the conceptual level, the ideological transformation of the Kurdish movement is 
represented by the shift in emphasis away from ‘Kurdistan’ towards ‘Mesopotamia’. On the 
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practical level, this ambition is given shape where the municipalities run by the pro-Kurdish 
party cooperate with and reinforce the development of a Kurdish civil society, and where, 
consequently, a substantive, alternative Kurdish social and political space has come into 
being, as  displayed at the Mesopotamia Social Forum. The ideological shifts find, in other 
words, very concrete spatial and political translations, while at the same time, being shaped 
themselves by the socio-political (re)organization in Turkey’s Southeast. Thus is the existing 
socio-political organization of geographies into nation-states being rethought and actively 
acted upon and transformed in territories variously specified in terms of ‘Turkey’, 
‘Kurdistan’, ‘the Middle East’ and now (again) ‘Mesopotamia’.  
 
These situated developments are not understandable though through a mere localized reading 
of the developments of late, but inscribed into a relational approach of place and space,49 as 
demonstrated by the way in which the aforementioned discourses, frames of references and 
action repertoires of the Global Justice Movement are actively incorporated and adjusted in 
the (Turkish) Kurdish context. Indeed, these globalized discourses, frames and action 
repertoires are being appropriated, transformed and acted upon locally by the activists of the 
Kurdish movement, which in turn still aspires to raise its voice and gain recognition as 
vanguard movement within the international left. Indeed, the Kurdish movement’s 
ideologically inspired appropriation and re-imagination of Mesopotamia can be regarded an 
on-going act which, in its relation to and positioning vis-à-vis globally hegemonic forms of 
political organization, seeks to produce an alternative political imaginary and consequent 
political project in response to the socio-political realities it holds responsible for existing 
inequalities, aspiring to increased international recognition for what it perceives as its 
realizations and thereby repositioning itself globally. In this sense also, Öcalan’s historical 
analysis of the wider region, far from being overtaken and outdated by the various socio-
political (re-)configurations and uprisings of the Arab spring, constitutes a radical reading of 
the limitations of democratization initiatives born of nation-state defined ‘regime change’. 
 
However, in reconsidering the writings by Öcalan that are inspiring (and also inspired by) the 
recent political re-configuration of the municipalities controlled or influenced by the Kurdish 
movement, we are also faced with a number of questions and paradoxes. While in his writings 
the Kurdish leader is explaining Kurdish nationalism as a modern phenomena and warning of 
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the dangers he considers inherent in all forms of nationalism, including Kurdish nationalism, 
Öcalan nevertheless depicts Kurds as one of the most ancient peoples of the world, and 
reiterates their history as legitimizing the contemporary, i.e. as explanatory of and therefore 
justifying Kurdish existence (identity) and the political demands of the Kurdish movement.50 
The employment of a (pre-)historical mythology of an identified ethnic group in the service of 
its present-day claims is, one cannot fail to note, a classical ingredient of nationalist narration. 
What is more, the Kurds appear as a predestined or ‘chosen’ people who are to set other 
peoples and the Middle Eastern region free. Mesopotamia is employed as a myth that is to 
help raise collective awareness and to mobilize the masses.  
 
The alternative Kurdish social and political space that is being developed in the Southeast of 
Turkey is also, we cannot deny, nurturing the sense of ‘being Kurdish’ and fleshing out the 
reality of what it means to be ‘Kurdish’, and thus realizing the idea of a people, actively 
constituting a nation. Equally, the MSF – although aspiring to present the Kurdish movement 
as a universal movement for radical political change and trying to incorporate a broad range 
of different political groups on the left of the political spectrum, as well as different ethnic and 
religious minorities – was almost exclusively focused on local and regional concerns. It 
contributed to a presentation of ‘the Kurdish people’ being simultaneously victims and 
challengers of the status quo. 
  
The ideas and undertakings discussed raise questions such as those linked to concepts of 
ethno-nationality suggested of Öcalan’s work. It certainly appears somewhat paradoxical, if 
not plain contradictory, that the new ideological ideals of the Kurdish movement criticizing 
any kind of state formation are at the same time functioning as the explanatory framework for 
what some would regard as a proto-state locally being developed. Indeed, Watts has already 
pointed out that whereas the BDP mayors (and their predecessors in DEHAP and the DTP) 
have been seeking to de-Turkify their municipalities, they are at the same time developing 
their own instruments of governmentality in order to manage, control and Kurdify the local 
population.51 In the mayors’ defense, it can of course be argued that, sensitized by the 
consciousness of decades of oppression – and for the older ones especially, this has been very 
much a lived consciousness – at least they are enacting the new nationalism, if that is what it 
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is, in a more democratic, tolerant fashion than had previously been the case with the old one. 
In other words, huge shifts have taken place in the political landscape of southeast Turkey and 
there is certainly an ongoing process of radical reform, but it remains unclear whether it is a 
revolution that has started or whether the Kurdish Movement will be able to live up to its own 
proclaimed revolutionary credentials.  
 
Biographical note 
Marlies Casier is Dr. in Political Sciences, affiliated with the Middle East and North Africa 
Research Group of the Ghent University, Belgium. She has researched the transnational 
political activism of the Kurdish movement in Turkey and published articles in Ethnicities, 
Mediterranean Politics, New Perspectives on Turkey and Social Identities. Together with 
Joost Jongerden, she co-edited Nationalisms and Politics in Turkey, published by Routledge 
in 2011.  
 
 
